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T 1 He laid down as principles God and matter, God being good and matter evil, the measure 
of God’s goodness far surpassing that of the evilness of matter. (trans. Van der Horst - 
Mansfeld) 
 ἀρχὰς ἐτίθετο θεὸν καὶ ὕλην, εἶναι δὲ τὸν µὲν θεὸν ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ ὕλην κακόν· ἀγαθῷ δὲ πλείονι 
τὸν θεὸν ὑπερβάλλειν ἢ κακῷ τὴν ὕλην. (4.24-5.3 Brinkmann) 
T 2 So he sent a certain power, which we call Soul, towards matter, which was to mingle with 
it throughout. 
 πέµψαι οὖν τινα δύναµιν, τὴν ὑφ´ ἡµῶν καλουµένην ψυχήν, ἐπὶ τὴν ὕλην, ἥτις αὐτῇ διὰ πάσης 
µιχθήσεται· (5.21-22) 
T 3 Then God was filled with pity for Soul’s plight and sent another power which we call 
Demiurge. When this power had arrived and had put its hand to creating the universe 
[…]. 
 οἰκτεῖραι οὖν τοῦτο τὸν θεὸν καὶ πέµψαι τινὰ ἑτέραν δύναµιν, ἣν ἡµεῖς καλοῦµεν δηµιουργόν. ἧς 
δὴ ἀφικοµένης καὶ τῇ κοσµοποιία ἐπικεχειρηκυίας κτλ. (6.6-9)  
T 4 For, apart from the Demiurge, there is another power which, having descended towards 
the luminosity of the sun, fulfils this task. 
 ἐπὶ γάρ τοι τῷ δηµιουργῷ ἑτέραν δύναµιν ἐπὶ τὸ φωτοειδὲς τοῦ ἡλίου κατελθοῦσαν ταῦτα 
διαπραγµατεύσασθαι, (6.22-24)  
T 5 He does not speak of matter in Plato’s sense, which would mean defining it as that which 
becomes all things when it assumes quality and shape, — which is why Plato calls it “all-
receiving” and “mother” and “nurse”, — nor in Aristotle’s sense, namely as the element in 
relation to which form and privation occur. He means something entirely different, for it 
is the random motion within each individual thing which he calls matter. 
 τὴν δὲ ὕλην λέγει οὐχ ἣν Πλάτων, τὴν πάντα γινοµένην ὅταν λάβῃ ποιότητα καὶ σχῆµα — διὸ 
πανδεχῆ καὶ µητέρα καὶ τιθήν<ην> καλεῖ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, τὸ στοιχεῖον περὶ ὃ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ 
στέρησις, ἀλλ´ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα· τὴν γὰρ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων ἄτακτον κίνησιν, ταύτην 
ὕλην καλεῖ (5.3-8)  
T 6 But this is exactly what we said to be the property of matter, viz., that it is nothing in itself 
and receives the shapes and the qualities, and in this way becomes all the things which 
are determinate. 
 τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ὃ ἐλέγοµεν ἴδιον τῆς ὕλης εἶναι, τὸ µηδέν τι οὖσαν καθ’ ἑαυτὴν δεχοµένην δὲ τὰ 
σχήµατα καὶ τὰς ποιότητας πάντα γίγνεσθαι τὰ διωρισµένα. (28.7-10) 
T 7 For matter in itself and taken absolutely is neither body nor something definitely 
incorporeal nor just a concrete thing, but it is something indefinite, and it becomes 
definite upon the reception of form; for example, when it receives the form of the 
pyramid it becomes fire, when that of the octaedron, air, when that of the icosaedron, 
water, when that of the cube, earth. 
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 ὅλως γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὴν µὲν ἡ ὕλη οὔτε σῶµά ἐστιν οὔτε ἀκριβῶς ἀσώµατόν τι οὔτε ἁπλῶς τόδε τι, 
ἀλλ’ ἀόριστός τις προσλαβοῦσα τὸ εἶδος γίνεται ὡρισµένη, οἷον τὴν πυραµίδα µὲν πῦρ, τὸ 
ὀκτάεδρον δὲ ἀήρ, τὸ εἰκοσάεδρον δὲ ὕδωρ, κύβον δὲ γῆ. (10.19-23) 
T 8 […] the matter assumed by those who have their wits about them, i.e. the matter which 
reason finds to be either absolutely non-existent or that which comes last in the scale of 
being and which can only with difficulty be grasped by some sort of bastard concept. 
  τὴν ὑπειληµµένην παρὰ τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν, ἣν ἢ µὴ παντάπασιν οὖσαν ὁ λόγος εὑρίσκει ἢ τὸ 
πάντων ἔσχατον καὶ µόγις εἰς ἔννοιαν νόθον ἀφικνεῖσθαι δυνάµενον. 
T 9 He [= Mani] posits two principles, God and matter. If he does so in order to distinguish 
between being and becoming, his assumption is less mistaken. For in that case, neither 
would matter form itself, and so avoid the contradiction of being both active and 
passible, nor would similar contradictions - which it is perhaps illegitimate even to 
mention — be attributable to the productive cause, although it should not he forgotten 
that God is wholly independent of matter as to his works, since in relation to that 
Intellect all things are capable of coming into being hypostatically. (trans. Van der Horst - 
Mansfeld, modified) 
 Δύο ἀρχὰς ὑποτίθεται, θεὸν καὶ ὕλην. εἰ µὲν τὸ γιγνόµενον τοῦ ὄντος ἀποχωρίζων, οὐχ ὁµοίως 
φαύλη ἡ ὑπόθεσις, ἵνα µήτε ἡ ὕλη ἑαυτὴν ποιῇ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐναντίων ἀποδέχηται λόγον, ποιοῦσά 
τε καὶ πάσχουσα, µήτ’ αὖ τοιαῦτα πάλιν ἕτερα περὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον θεωρῆται, ἃ οὐδὲ λέγειν 
ἴσως θέµις — καίτοι οὐ δεοµένου τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς τὰ ἀποτελέσµατα ὕλης, ἐν ὑποστάσει 
δυναµένων γίγνεσθαι πάντων πρὸς ἐκεῖνον τὸν νοῦν. (9.17-10.4) 
T 10 I find it hard to believe that neither Mani nor his followers paid any attention to the fact 
that, if God created this power of his own free will – as in the true doctrine those entities 
which come next in order, while God remains, are said to be hypostases – absolutely 
nothing would keep him from becoming the cause of all the other things which come into 
being as well, without being dependent on any pre-existing matter in any way. 
 εἰ δὲ ἐποίησεν αὐτὴν καὶ ὕλης ἄµοιρός ἐστιν, θαυµάζω πῶς οὐκ ἐσκόπησαν οὔτε οὗτος οὔτε οἱ 
ἀπ’ ἐκείνου, ὅτι εἰ — ὃ λέγεται κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ὅτι τὰ ἐφεξῆς µένοντος τοῦ θεοῦ 
ὑποστάσεις εἰσὶν —τὴν δύναµιν ταύτην ἐποίησεν βουληθεὶς ὁ θεός, πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἁπάντων τῶν γενοµένων αἴτιος ἐγένετο οὐδὲν ὕλης προὑπαρχούσης προσδεηθείς (24.16-23) 
T 11 If, on the other hand – as seems to be his real meaning – matter is the random motion 
inherent in things two remarks must be made. First, that he seems to be ignorant of the 
fact that he attributes reality to another productive principle as well, though it be only 
the cause of evil. Second, that he does not seem to observe what is entailed by his 
assumption, viz., that if both God and matter have to be assumed as being absolutely real, 
another matter will come into being for God, in order that each productive principle be 
provided with an underlying matter of its own. In that case, however, he will stand 
convicted in our eyes of having introduced four principles instead of two. 
 εἰ δέ, ὅπερ µᾶλλον λέγεσθαι δοκεῖ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἡ ἄτακτος κίνησις τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν <ἡ> ὕλη, 
πρῶτον µὲν λανθάνει ἑαυτὸν ἕτερον ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ὑφιστάµενος, κακοποιὸν µέντοι, οὐχ ὁρᾷ δὲ 
καὶ τὸ ἑπόµενον, ὅτι εἰ θεὸν πάντως ὑποστατέον καὶ ὕλην, ἑτέρα τις ὕλη τῷ θεῷ ὑποστήσεται, 
ἵνα ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ποιητικῶν αἰτίων ἡ ὑποκειµένη ὑπάρχῃ ὕλη. ἀντὶ τοίνυν δύο τέτταρας ἡµῖν 
ποιῶν ἀρχὰς ἐπιδειχθήσεται. (10.4-11) 
T 12 The corollary to this division is equally amazing. For if God, in his view, amounts to what 
is good, and if he wishes to assume God's opposite as real, why then does he refrain from 
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opposing to him what is evil in the same manner as certain Pythagoreans have done? For 
certainly this Pythagorean theory is easier to accept; the Pythagoreans speak of two 
principles, good and evil, which are continually at war, while the good prevails, since all 
things must perish if evil were to gain the upper hand.  
 θαυµαστὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀντιδιαίρεσις. εἰ γὰρ θεός ἐστιν παρ’ αὐτῷ ὅπερ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ βούλεται 
ὑφίστασθαι αὐτῷ ἐναντίον, διὰ τί οὐ καθάπερ τινὲς τῶν Πυθαγορείων τὸ κακὸν αὐτῷ 
ἀντιτίθησιν; ἀνεκτότερον γοῦν ὑπ’ ἐκείνων λέγεται δύο εἶναι ἀρχάς, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, 
στασιάζειν δὲ ταύτας συνεχῶς, ἐπικρατεῖν δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ κακὸν ὑπερέχοι, φθαρήσεσθαι 
πάντα. (10.12-19)  
T 13 Alex. Lyc. (from T 7): ὅλως γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὴν µὲν ἡ ὕλη οὔτε σῶµά ἐστιν οὔτε ἀκριβῶς ἀσώµατόν 
τι οὔτε ἁπλῶς τόδε τι, ἀλλ’ ἀόριστός τις προσλαβοῦσα τὸ εἶδος γίνεται ὡρισµένη  
T 14 Porph. Sent. 2: Things in themselves incorporeal, precisely in virtue of the fact that they 
are superior to all place, are everywhere, not in extension, but partlessly. (trans. J. Dillon)  
 Τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ ἀσώµατα, αὐτῷ ᾧ κρείττονα παντός ἐστι τόπου, πανταχῇ ἐστιν, οὐ διαστατῶς, 
ἀλλ' ἀµερῶς.  
 Sent. 4: Things in themselves incorporeal are not present to bodies and do not mix with 
them in their reality and their essence, but rather in virtue of a reality generated by their 
inclination they impart a power which acts immediately upon bodies. For the inclination 
generates a secondary power which acts immediately upon bodies. 
 Τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ ἀσώµατα ὑποστάσει µὲν καὶ οὐσίᾳ οὐ πάρεστιν οὐδὲ συγκίρναται τοῖς σώµασι, τῇ 
δὲ ἐκ τῆς ῥοπῆς ὑποστάσει τινὸς δυνάµεως µεταδίδωσι προσεχοῦς τοῖς σώµασιν. ἡ γὰρ ῥοπὴ 
δευτέραν τινὰ δύναµιν ὑπέστησε προσεχῆ τοῖς σώµασιν.  
T 15 Alc. Did. 163.7-8: τοιαύτη δ’ οὖσα οὔτε σῶµα ἂν εἴη οὔτε ἀσώµατον. Apul. De Plat. 1.5, §192: sed 
neque corpoream nec sane incorpoream concedit esse; Tertull. Adv. Herm. 54.19-20; Calc. in 
Tim. 314.18: neque corpus neque incorporeum quiddam posse dici simpliciter puto. Also 
Arius Did. ap. Stob. 1.11.4 = Epit. phys. Fr. 2, DG 448 (presented as Aristotelian doctrine, 
but mixed up with Platonic metaphors). 
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T 16 Are God and matter (1) wholly incorporeal, or (2) is the one corporeal, the other 
incorporeal, or (3) are both corporeal? 
 <ad (1)> For if each is incorporeal, neither can be in the other – except perhaps in the 
manner of grammatical knowledge being in the soul. But in regard to God and matter 
such a conception is absurd. Or is the one within the other as in a void, just as some 
people hold the void to surround the universe? Then the other principle is without 
reality, for the essence of the void is nothingness. Perhaps in the manner of attributes? 
Our first objection is that this is impossible, for they cannot, when bereft of substance, be 
anywhere, since substance is a kind of vehicle supporting the attributes. <ad 3> If each is 
a body, then of necessity they are both heavy or both light or both intermediate between 
heavy and light, or one of them is heavy or one of them is light or one of them is 
intermediate. If, then, they are both heavy, they will of necessity be compacted, and the 
same holds good also when they are both light and both intermediate. If, on the other 
hand, they differ from one another, the one will be absolutely separated from the other. 
For there is one place for what is heavy and another for what is intermediate and another 
for what is light: up for what is light, down for what is heavy, and for the other what is 
between top and bottom. The bottom of each sphere is at its centre, for from the centre 
towards the whole superior region up till the upper surface the distance is the same 
everywhere. And, again, all heavy objects from all directions fly towards the central place. 
Which is why I could not suppress a grin when I heard that matter moving in its random 
way – for that is what would be natural for matter – arrived at the region of God, which is 
the light and the brilliant and so on. <ad 2> If the one is a body and the other 
incorporeal, then, first, only that which is body will be movable; next, if they are 
unmingled, each will be separate according to its own nature; but if the one is mingled 
with the other, it should be either soul or intellect or attribute. For it is only in this way 
that incorporeals are allowed to mingle with bodies. 
 (1) Πότερον δὲ ὅλως ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἀσώµατα, (2) ἢ τὸ µὲν σῶµα τὸ δὲ ἀσώµατον, (3) ἢ ἄµφω 
σώµατα; (ad 1)  εἰ µὲν γὰρ ἀσώµατα ἑκάτερα, οὐδέτερον ἐν οὐδετέρῳ· πλὴν εἰ µὴ ὡς 
γραµµατικὴ ἐν ψυχῇ — τοῦτο δὲ ἄτοπον ἐπὶ θεοῦ καὶ ὕλης ἐπινοεῖν —· εἴτε ὡς ἐν κενῷ, ὥς τινες 
λέγουσιν τὸ κενὸν τῷ παντὶ περικεχύσθαι, τὸ ἕτερον πάλιν ἀνυπόστατον, οὐσία γὰρ τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ 
µηδέν· εἰ δὲ ὡς συµβεβηκότα, πρῶτον µὲν ἀδύνατον τοῦτο, οὐσίας γὰρ ἄµοιρα ὄντα οὐδαµοῦ 
εἶναι δύναται, ὄχηµα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ὑποβεβληµένον τοῖς συµβεβηκόσιν ἡ οὐσία. (ad 3) εἰ δὲ 
σώµατα ἑκάτερα, ἀνάγκη ἢ ἄµφω βαρέα εἶναι ἢ ἄµφω κοῦφα ἢ µέσα, ἢ τὸ µὲν βαρὺ ἢ τὸ δὲ 
κοῦφον ἢ τὸ δὲ µέσον. εἴτε οὖν ἑκάτερα βαρέα, σὺν πάσῃ οὕτω γε ἀνάγκη εἶναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ 
ἐπὶ τῶν κούφων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν µέσων· εἴτε παραλλάττοιτο, τὸ ἕτερον πάντως τοῦ ἑτέρου ἔσται 
κεχωρισµένον. ἄλλος γὰρ τῷ βαρεῖ καὶ ἄλλος τῷ µέσῳ καὶ τῷ κούφῳ τόπος, τῷ µὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄνω 
τῷ δὲ τὸ κάτω τῷ δὲ τὸ µέσον. παντὸς δὲ σφαιροειδοῦς τὸ κάτω µέσον ἐστίν, ἀπὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦ 
πρὸς πᾶν τὸ µετέωρον ἄχρι τῆς ἄνω ἐπιφανείας πάντοθέν ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόστασις ἴση· καὶ πάντα 
πάλιν τὰ βαρέα πανταχόθεν φέρεται ἐπ’ αὐτά·  διὸ καὶ γέλωτός µοι ἐπῆλθεν ἀκούσαντι ὅτι 
κινουµένη ἡ ὕλη ἀτάκτως — τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτῇ κατὰ φύσιν — εἰς τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀφίκετο χώραν, ἥ 
ἐστι φῶς καὶ λαµπρὸν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. (ad 2) εἰ δὲ τὸ µὲν σῶµα τὸ δὲ ἀσώµατον, πρῶτον 
µὲν ὅ ἐστιν σῶµα µόνον κινητόν ἐστιν· ἔπειτα δὲ εἰ µὲν ἄµικτά ἐστιν, χωρὶς ἑκάτερον κατὰ τὴν 
οἰκείαν φύσιν, εἰ δὲ µέµικται τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ἢ ψυχὴ ἢ νοῦς ἢ συµβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη· οὕτω γὰρ 
µόνον τὰ ἀσώµατα τοῖς σώµασι πάρεστι µίγνυσθαι. (13.10-14.17) 
